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Abstract
This paper contributes to the aid effectiveness debate by applying a vector autore-
gression model to a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries. This method avoids the
need for instrumental variables and allows one to analyse the effect of foreign aid on
human development and on economic development simultaneously. The full sample
results indicate a small increase in economic growth following a fairly substantial aid
shock. The size of the effect puts the result somewhere between the arguments of aid
optimists and those of aid pessimists. Human development, for which I use the growth
rate of life expectancy as a proxy, responds positively to aid shocks in democracies.
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1 Introduction
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the main tool employed by the rich world in its
attempts to promote prosperity in the developing world. Given the importance of this tool,
it should not be a surprise that many scholars of development consider its effects worthy
of study, particularly its effects on economic growth. Unfortunately, from a policy maker’s
perspective at least, the approach taken by most of these works has yielded findings across
the full spectrum of potential results. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006) point out that the
literature has found aid to be “effective, ineffective or even harmful” (p 228). The objective
here is to employ a different method - a method that does not require as many (often
controversial) assumptions.
This paper estimates the effects of aid in a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) framework.
For the most part, the existing literature estimates standard growth regressions augmented
with aid terms on panel data and attempts to overcome the endogeneity problem between
growth and aid with standard instrumental variables techniques. The PVAR approach avoids
the need for instrumentation strategies as all variables in a PVAR are recognised to be
endogenous. Each variable is regressed on its own lags and those of the other variables.
Only a minimal set of assumptions is required to interpret the effect of shocks in each
variable on the system. Another merit of this notoriously atheoretical approach is that, as
both Easterly (2003) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) point out, much of this
literature suffers from a lack of a formal theory linking aid and growth to guide applied
researchers in settling on an econometric specification. As will be shown below, nothing
approaching a consensus has emerged from the literature and many key findings have been
found to be less than robust to changes in sample or specification.
Vector autoregressions have been used by researchers to study the effect of foreign aid in a
particular country. For example, Osei, Morrissey and Lloyd (2005) examines the fiscal effects
of aid in Ghana while Morrissey, M’Amanja and Lloyd (2006) examines the effect of ODA on
growth in Kenya. Hansen and Headey (2010) employs a PVAR model to examine the short-
run effects of aid on net imports and spending, though they do not examine growth. Very
recently, Juselius, Møller and Tarp (2014) have used a conintegrating VAR model to examine
the macroeconomic effects of aid in 36 Sub-Saharan African countries. This paper’s main
contribution is to expand on the work of Morrissey and his co-authors and by widening the
scope via methods similar to those used by Hansen and Headey (2010). It also complements
the work done by Juselius et al. While they quite rightly point out that a panel study should
only be used with great caution to inform policy advice for a particular country, the question
“does aid work on average?” is still one of interest for policy makers and one that has a long
academic history as I will outline presently.
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The second contribution of this paper is that the PVAR approach allows one to examine
another side of development simultaneously. Taken as a whole, the foreign aid effectiveness
literature is vast. While most of this literature looks at aid’s effects on economic development,
there is a smaller, yet growing, body of work that looks at aid’s effect on human development
as measured by variables such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and the infant
mortality rate. However, single equation techniques can only focus on one issue at a time. It
makes sense to make use of the multi-equation nature of a PVAR to examine both aspects
of development (very broadly defined) simultaneously, as while GDP per capita is a good
measure of the overall state of a society, it is far from perfect. Economic development is
surely a large part of the concept of development but there are other elements that matter.
Interest lies specifically with the impulse response functions (IRFs) obtained from the model.
These will show the response path of economic growth and human development to a one time
shock in foreign aid holding all other shocks at zero. The sample is then split into groups
defined by economic policy and democracy. This allows us to see if there is any evidence
that aid is more effective in certain environments.
Several important and policy relevant results emerge from the analysis. Firstly, aid shocks
do seem to induce economic growth in the first few years following the shock. However,
this initial response is less than 1% extra growth per annum and is tempered by some
later negative responses. Secondly, aid appears to have a small positive effect on human
development, though the error bands do not allow us to rule out that the effect is negative
or non-existant. In countries with good economic policy, the early effect of aid on economic
growth jumps to about 2%, though this is once again tempered by some negative responses
later on. In democracies, aid has a much larger effect on human development and a less
pronounced effect on economic growth than in either the full sample or in autocracies.
One of the main implications of these findings is that while aid does lead to economic growth,
the effect is not transformative and to maintain even an extra 1% of growth would require
frequent large injections of aid. Another is that while the response of GDP per capita growth
is higher in some environments, it is not so much higher that donors could justify focusing
all aid monies on countries with these characteristics. This is further supported by the fact
that often it is the case that when aid fails to have an effect on one of the dimensions of
development in one of the sub-samples, it does effect the other.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the existing literature.
Section 3 outlines the data and discusses issues of measurement. Section 4 describes the
econometric approach in detail. Sections 5 and 6 present the baseline and grouped results
respectively and Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Existing Literature
2.1 Aid and Economic Development
There are many studies that have examined the effect of aid on growth. I limit myself here
to the more recent work, both for brevity and because they adequately highlight the issues
that will be examined in Section 6.1 Recent work has chiefly focused on conditional aid
effectiveness.
Burnside and Dollar (2000) reignited the aid effectiveness debate when they found that while
aid has no effect on growth on average, aid works in a good policy environment. They in-
clude an aid*policy interaction term and find that it is statistically significant and robust
to a number of specifications. This paper launched the debate on conditional aid effective-
ness. Hansen and Tarp (2001) were the first to challenge this result using the exact same
dataset as Burnside and Dollar (2000). They include quadratic aid and policy terms along-
side an aid*policy interaction and show that this leads to the latter becoming insignificant.
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) recreate the Burnside-Dollar dataset and expand on
it significantly. By following the approach of Burnside and Dollar to the letter, they find
that not only is the crucial aid*policy coefficient insignificant but it has the opposite sign.
Easterly (2003) re-examines the issue in a different way. By employing Official Development
Assistance (ODA) as the measure of aid as opposed to the measure used by Burnside and
Dollar, Effective Development Assistance (EDA), Easterly finds that the aid*policy interac-
tion term is no longer significant. He also varies the specification of good policy and again
finds that the aid*policy term is insignificant. The crucial interaction term is also found
to be insignificant by varying the definition of growth (Burnside and Dollar defined growth
as real GDP growth over four years) to consider eight, twelve and twenty four years. Tan
(2009) uses an error correction estimation approach and finds that both aid and good policy
have significant long run effects on growth but that the interaction of the two is actually
bad for growth.
One of the best examples of support for the Burnside-Dollar result comes from Collier and
Dollar (2002). They expand the Burnside-Dollar dataset to include 349 aid-growth-policy
episodes as opposed to the original 275. The other modification they make is to employ
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as their policy vari-
able. Their findings agree with the Burnside-Dollar result. However, Dalgaard, Hansen
and Tarp (2004) question the suitability of the CPIA for growth regressions. They include
a climate*aid interaction term and find that it is significant. The aid*policy term loses its
significance once climate*aid enters the specification. They suggest that the climate variable
1Roodman (2007) provides an excellent overview of the entire literature and Deaton (2010) discusses the
potential problems with the IV strategies commonly employed in this area.
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may be a proxy for deep determinants such as institutions. This is a significantly different
conditional effectiveness result. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) find no unconditional effect
of aid on growth or investment and no conditional effect in good policy or geographical
environments. The potential importance of both policy and democratic institutions will be
examined in Section 6.
Svensson (1999) examines whether civil and political liberties play any role in aid effective-
ness. He finds that an aid*democracy interaction term is highly significant and that an
aid*policy term a` la Burnside and Dollar is insignificant. It is important to note that he
considers, and rejects, the possibility that democracy is simply a proxy for good policies.
This suggests we should add democracy to our list of conditional results to be examined.2
This sample of the aid and economic growth literature is chiefly included to motivate the
division of the sample into groups defined by economic policy, institutions and democracy in
Section 6. However, it also shows that the traditional approach of running either standard
cross-sectional or panel growth regressions augmented with aid and aid interaction terms
leads to fragile results. Indeed, the title of Roodman (2007), ‘The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid,
Development, and Cross-Country Empirics’, sums up the literature well. Each of the papers
is a fine econometric work, and it may be that these factors do indeed matter, but the fragility
of the results is undeniable. Roodman examines seven leading papers in the aid-growth
literature, (including Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dollar (2002) and Dalgaard,
Hansen and Tarp (2004)) and finds that each of them is susceptible to changes in the sample
and in specification. Similarly, Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi (2012), a paper that
makes many very important contributions, shows that changes to the identification strategy
of three influential papers in the literature, including Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Rajan
and Subramanian (2008), changes the results dramatically and brings their findings into
broad agreement that aid has an unconditional effect on growth. The prospect of a fresh
perspective is a major motivating factor in employing the PVAR methodology.
2.2 Aid and Human Development
While nowhere near as extensive as that which concerns itself with economic development,
there is a small but growing literature that seeks to empirically assess the effect of foreign
aid on human development.
Kosack (2003) finds that aid has a positive effect on HDI growth but only in democratic
countries. His estimates also suggest that aid will have a negative effect on HDI growth
2While I do not examine this in what follows, it is worth noting that if aid were to encourage democratic
reform then aid could be good for growth insofar as democracy and good institutions are growth promoting.
The evidence on this is somewhat mixed though as Heckelman (2010) finds that more aid is associated with
some types of democratic reform while Dutta et al. (2013) argue that aid cannot make a democracy of an
autocracy but can “amplify” a state’s existing tendencies.
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in autocracies. Interestingly, he finds that democracy alone has a negative effect on HDI
growth. He interprets these findings as implying that ‘more-democratic poor countries have,
on their own, lower growth in the quality of life, but that aid to these countries may reverse
this negative tendency’ (p6).
McGillivray and Noorbakhsh (2007) examine the effect of aid on the level of the HDI and
allow conflict to enter the analysis. They find that aid alone has a negative effect on HDI
scores but disagree with Kosack (2003) in that they do not find either a negative effect of
democracy on the HDI or a positive aid*democracy interaction term. These two studies
gives us a second reason to divide the sample along lines of democracy.
Using quantile regression, Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2005b) examine aid’s effects on
human development as measured by both the HDI and the infant mortality rate. They argue
that while aid might not have a direct effect on welfare, it may have an indirect one via pro-
public expenditures (PPE). By constructing a PPE index they find that aid has a positive
effect on welfare through public expenditure and that the effect is greater in countries with
lower welfare. They also argue that good economic policy is not required for aid to be
effective in promoting human development. A related paper, Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley
and Verschoor (2005a), finds to the contrary that there is a direct effect of aid on human
development and little evidence of an indirect effect via PPE. It is clear that there is nearly
as much disagreement and tendency for conflicting results in the aid-human development
literature as there is in the aid-growth literature.
There are of course more works that concern themselves with the effects of aid on economic
and human development. However, the papers above provide a sufficient overview of the
evidence and suggest that it may be illuminating to examine whether aid has different effects
in groups of countries defined by economic policy and democracy.
3 Data
The data on yearly economic growth comes from the World Bank’s World Development In-
dicators (WDI). This paper uses the notation aidit to represent total net ODA per capita.
This includes flows from all donors (as measured by the OECD) to recipient i at time t.
aidit is measured in constant 2007 US dollars. The data come from the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee. EDA is an adjustment to ODA that replaces the official loans
component with the grant equivalents of official loans and disregards grants that are tied to
technical assistance (Chang, Fernandez-Arias and Serven (1999)). Although this may seem
like an important modification, the two are hugely correlated.3 I choose to use ODA as the
3Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) show that the correlation between the two (as a fraction of GDP) in
nominal terms is 0.98 and between real EDA and nominal ODA it is 0.89. They also suggest that the
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aim of the paper is to assess the effect of the West’s efforts and ODA is the tool they employ.
In addition, the ODA data is available for a longer span of time.
I consider life expectancy to be an ideologically clean proxy for human development and
it has been similarly used by others (Knowles and Owen (2010)). While there are other
aspects to human development, a long lifespan is essential to pursue many of them. The
data, which again comes from the World Bank’s WDI, is of sufficient length and covers a
sufficient number of countries. The specific variable, denoted as HDit, is the growth rate of
total life expectancy at birth (in years).
The data allows for a balanced panel of 31 countries over the period 1973-2005. The list
of countries that are used in the analysis, along with summary statistics, can be seen in
Appendix A.
4 Econometric Approach
The results obtained in this paper are obtained from a PVAR model of the form:
Zit = α0 +
p∑
q=1
βqZit−q + ǫit (1)
where Zit is the vector (aidit, growthit, HDit), α0 is a vector containing the constant terms,
βq is the matrix of coefficients for lag q and ǫit is distributed as (0, σ
2
i ) with E(ǫitǫ
′
is) = 0
for all t 6= s. Simply put, the model is comprised of three equations in which each variable
is regressed on its own lags and those of the other two variables. While it is a seemingly
simple set of equations, it must be noted that a great deal of information can be accounted
for with a sufficiently long lag structure.
This model can be viewed as the most restrictive possible in that it imposes common slopes
and common intercepts and can be estimated by Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS). It
is well known that POLS yields biased and inconsistent estimates if the true data generating
process contains a fixed effect. To reduce such concerns, only countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa are considered. All countries are of course different, but these countries should form a
sufficiently homogeneous group to allow POLS estimates of the relationships between ODA,
economic growth and human development to be meaningful. Such concerns should be further
reduced by the division of the sample into the subgroups outlined above.
difference between the two measures ‘seems to be a simple transformation’ (p26).
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A less restrictive model is a dynamic panel data model with country fixed effects. Such a
model can be estimated via GMM techniques as is done by Love and Zicchino (2006).4 This
approach will be used as a check on the main results. If the true model contains a fixed
effect, then any estimation that omits such effects will be incorrect. Therefore it is very
important to compare the results of the POLS and GMM estimators. As we will see, they
are very similar suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is not a serious concern in this
exercise.5
The parameter estimates of Equation (1) are not of any particular interest. They are reduced
form parameters which in many applications, including this one, have no real meaning or
direct interpretation. What are of interest are the impulse response functions that can be
obtained via a simple transformation of Equation (1). These functions trace out the response
path of a variable over time following a one time shock to another holding all other shocks
at zero. So when we are looking at the effect of foreign aid on GDP per capita growth, the
IRF in question will tell us (based on a simple transformation of the PVAR model above)
how much extra growth we would expect to see at each time period following a time zero
shock to aid. These paths are very often represented graphically and I do so in what follows.
To obtain the exogenous shocks that we are interested in, we must make some assumptions.
The most common way to obtain such orthogonalised shocks is to employ a Choleski decom-
position which orders the shocks in a sensible way. The channel of influence I impose is the
following:
aidit → growthit → HDit
Aid shocks can effect growth and human development contemporaneously; growth can effect
human development contemporaneously but only influences aid flows with a lag; human
development only operates on the other two variables with a lag. The choice of ordering is a
crucial factor in any VAR exercise.6 The rationale behind the chosen ordering is as follows:
• Donor countries (or their bureaucrats) need time to observe and react to changes in
the recipient country. Thus aid flows will only respond to changes in economic and
4The main reason that the GMM procedure is not preferred is that it is best suited to very large N
datasets (i.e firm level data). Another is the relative accessibility of POLS. As we will see, the methods
give remarkably similar results. While both methods are potentially biased, it seems unlikely that the very
different biases would lead to the same results.
5An even less restrictive variant of Equation (1.1) allows for both country specific intercepts and slopes.
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that these sort of models can be estimated by applying the Mean Group
Estimator (MGE). This is the method adopted by Hansen and Headey (2010). However, Rebucci (2003)
shows, using Monte Carlo simulations, that ‘the dispersion of the slope parameters around their mean must
be high in absolute terms for the heterogeneity bias of pooled estimators to be substantial’ (p26). In addition,
the simulations indicate that for MGE to be a useful alternative, the time dimension of the panel must be
longer than that which is to be found in most macroeconomic datasets.
6The importance of the ordering increases with the correlation between the reduced form innovations.
See Enders (2004) page 276.
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human development with a lag.
• It takes time for increasing human development to translate into economic develop-
ment. It is much more plausible that economic growth can have a contemporaneous
effect on human development.
While this is only one of six possible orderings, it seems the most plausible and the results
are not sensitive to alternative orderings (available on request). I follow Love and Zicchino
(2006) and Hansen and Headey (2010) and construct 95% confidence intervals using Monte
Carlo Integration methods. I test for stationarity using the method outlined in Breitung
(2000). Breitung’s test, which he shows to be superior to others for the datasets of the
size employed here, suggests that all three variables are stationary. Finally, to determine
the appropriate number of lags to include, that is the p in Equation (1), I employ standard
information criteria.
5 Full Sample Results
5.1 POLS
Both the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion indi-
cate that the model should include eight lags. The IRFs obtained from the full sample of 31
countries can be seen in Figure 1. For completeness I present all the IRFs from the system
though our particular interest lies with the responses of the growth rates of GDP per capita
and life expectancy to a shock in aid. Each IRF shows the response path of the variable
in question to a one time positive one standard error increase in the estimate of the shock
variable holding all other shocks at zero. The values of the shocks can be read off the Y-axis
of the diagonal elements of Figure 1 at time zero. The aid shock is approximately $33 per
person.
In terms of the effect of an aid shock on economic development, the error bands are generally
tight enough for us to have confidence in the estimated response path. We can see that an aid
shock at time zero has an immediate, but small, positive effect on GDP per capita growth.
This positive effect increases to about 0.8% extra growth one period after the shock and the
positive effect still exists in period two. These short run increases in growth could perhaps
be the result of increases in government expenditure. This interpretation is in line with the
findings of Remmer (2004) that foreign aid increases recipient government expenditure and
may decrease tax effort. The next three periods see growth that is lower than it would have
been in the absence of the initial aid shock. This could also be seen as being in line with
Remmer (2004) i.e. recipient governments treat the aid shock at time zero as a permanent
increase and increase spending and decrease tax effort and are taken by surprise when it
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Figure 1: Full Sample IRFs: POLS
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Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws.
proves to be transitory.7 After this, we see a return to a positive response. This would fit
with government investments on infrastructure made with the initial aid shock paying off.
After the 10th step the initial shock has no more influence.
The overall pattern could also be related to the composition of a recipient governments
expenditure i.e. consumption versus investment. Studies such as Djankov, Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2006), Franco-Rodriguez, Morrissey and McGillivray (1998), Pack and Pack
(1993) and many others have examined issues such as this (some from the stance of fiscal
response modeling, others in terms of fungibility) and found different results depending on
the country or countries studied. This speculation highlights the biggest drawback of the
PVAR approach to studying foreign aid effectiveness (and the VAR methodology in general).
While we can see outcomes very well, the mechanisms are obscured.
7They may not be entirely wrong in this as Figure 1 shows that the response of aid to its own shocks
persists beyond fifteen periods, though it does drop rapidly to roughly a third of the value of the shock.
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So do we have evidence that aid is effective in terms of generating economic growth? The
positive responses seem to outweigh the periods where growth is lower than it would have
been. However, there are two important points one should bear in mind:
1. The extra injection of $33 per person is not cheap. Even at this level, the results do
not fit the description of transformative.
2. Given that the effects die out by the 11th period, can we say that the induced economic
growth is sustainable?
The results in terms of human development are less encouraging for aid advocates. The
estimated response path is positive for the most part but small in magnitude. That said,
the human life span is measured on a small scale and so an increase in its yearly growth rate
of even a fraction of a percent is arguably a meaningful and desirable outcome, especially
given that the response persists until the 10th period following the initial shock. However,
the error bands allow for the possibility that the effect may be negative. The results in this
respect are thus ambiguous.
5.2 Robustness: GMM
It is important to check if the baseline results are robust to allowing for country specific
effects. In other words, if the POLS approach gives different results to a model that allows
for fixed effects. To do this, I employ the PVAR Stata program written by Inessa Love. For
specific details of the procedure, I direct the reader to Love and Zicchino (2006). Briefly, the
estimator allows for country fixed effects which are removed by forward mean differencing.
The model is then estimated by GMM.
Inessa Love’s PVAR program will not allow me to obtain error bands for models with more
than six lags. The results from the model estimated with six lags are presented in Figure
2. The results of a model with eight lags (with no error bands) are very similar and are
presented in Appendix B. The IRFs only trace out the responses to six periods after the
initial shock and use a slightly different value for the shocks, but we can immediately see
that the pattern of responses to an aid shock are very similar to those obtained using POLS.
The aid shock is smaller yet it generates a larger, though still rather small, response in the
growth rate of human development and the economic growth response is roughly 50% of
the POLS outcome. However, the results of the eight lag GMM model show a similar level
of response to that of the POLS model. The error bands are also wider in the case of the
economic growth response, though the bulk of the error band lies above zero. Overall we can
be confident that POLS is a satisfactory method and that the results presented in Figure 1
are valid.
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Figure 2: Full Sample IRFs: GMM
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Notes: Each panel shows the response of the indicated response variable to a one standard deviation shock in the shock variable.
Results obtained using the PVAR program kindly made available to me by Inessa Love.
6 Conditional Results
6.1 Good Versus Bad Economic Policy
Given how influential the Burnside-Dollar results have been in donor circles, it makes sense
to use the model to see if we can find evidence of aid working better in a good policy
environment. One lesson to be taken from the literature is that often the definition of good
policy is somewhat arbitrary in what is included and once it is changed the significant results
disappear. With this in mind, I have chosen what is arguably the most objective measure of
economic policy available. The World Bank’s Doing Business project collects information
across a wide variety of aspects of the business environment and ranks countries on the
overall ease of doing business. The full methodology can be found on the project’s website.8
Here, it is sufficient to note that the surveys are as objective as possible and cover most
aspects of a country’s business environment. Thus, the ranking should provide a good proxy
for overall economic policy. This is quite a different measure of policy from the weighted
8http://www.doingbusiness.org
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Figure 3: Good Policy IRFs
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Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries which rank in the top 100 in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking.
indices of macroeconomic indicators that are commonly used in this literature.
I use the 2010 rankings as my measure. While this is open to criticism, the data only goes
back to 2004 and additional important variables have been added over time. I believe that
the data can safely be regarded as a good measure of a country’s stock of economic policies.
I consider a country with a ranking in the top 100 to have good economic policy. Countries
below this, admittedly arbitrary, cutoff form the bad policy sample. A benefit of dividing
the sample this way is that even if we would see countries move around somewhat in the
rankings over time had we the data, such broad ranges make it more likely that they remain
within the bounds I have set for good and bad policy. In any event, the cutoff would have
to be much more forgiving for many more countries to make into the good sample.
Figures 3 and 4 presents the IRFs obtained from running the model on each of the policy
groups. Only five countries made the cut for good policy. Appendix A shows which countries
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Figure 4: Bad Policy IRFs
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Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries which rank outside of the top 100 in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking.
are in this and each subsequent sub-sample. I continue to include eight lags in the model
over all samples.
The results are not as precise as those of Section 5 but are striking nonetheless. It is worth
noting that the magnitude of the aid shock in both cases are very similar. In the good
policy group, economic growth is actually lower than it would have been at t=0 absent the
aid shock. However, by t=1 growth is roughly 2% higher than it would have been. We see
the same pattern of negative response that we saw in the full sample after t=2 with some
small postitive responses after t=5. While the error bands do not allow one to discount
the possibility that these long lasting effects are negative, they were not present in the full
sample results. The bad policy sample responses are markedly different and (not surprisingly
given that these countries form the vast majority of the full sample) are similar to the full
sample results. The level of response is smaller though and we see some long lasting negative
responses that were absent in the full sample.
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In terms of human development, the error bands are too broad to draw much inference. In
the bad policy group the estimated effect is indistinguishable from zero for the most part.
In the good policy group the error bands are also too wide but we can see initial negative
responses. After that we cannot say with any certainty what sign the effect takes.
These results suggest that, in terms of increasing GDP per capita growth, aid does work
better in a good policy environment. On the other hand, the results certainly do not conform
to the arguments of the most despairing of aid pessimists in that we see some beneficial effects
of aid, even in countries with bad policy.
6.2 Democracy Vs. Autocracy
We saw in Section 2 that there is evidence that being a democracy matters for both dimen-
sions of aid effectiveness. To examine this issue, I utilise the measure of democracy created
by the Polity IV project. This variable combines information on democratic and autocratic
features of a country and places them on a scale from −10 (total autocracy) to +10 (full
democracy). This suggests a simple division of the sample. Countries with an average Polity
score (over the sample period) of less than 0 are consigned to the autocratic group. Those
with a score of 0 or higher form the democratic group.
Figures 5 and 6 show the IRFs for both sub-samples. As was the case with the bad policy
group, the autocratic group forms the vast majority of the full sample and it is therefore
unsurprising that the IRFs are very similar to the baseline results. The big difference is
that we see no appreciable positive effect of aid on human development. Turning to the
democratic sample, we see a relatively large response of human development to an initial aid
shock. Not only is it relatively large, it is unambiguously positive and persists to the 11th
step. As the shocks are once again of very similar magnitudes, this result partially supports
the findings of Kosack (2003) in that aid seems to work in terms of promoting human
development only in democratic countries. However, we cannot see any clear evidence of it
retarding human development in autocracies.
In terms of aid’s effect on economic growth, as noted above, the autocratic sample’s response
path is very similar to that of the full sample. The major difference is the late negative
responses that were absent in the full sample. The response path in the democratic sample
has error bands that are too wide to draw any firm inference for the most part, though the
initial responses seem to be positive. While these initial positive responses are smaller than
those in the autocratic sample, they last longer. After that, it is generally not possible to
make any inference about the sign of the response. These results, therefore, do not conform
with Svensson (1999) in that aid does not seem to be more effective in promoting economic
growth in democratic environments.
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Figure 5: Democratic IRFs
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Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample composed is of
those countries with an average value of 0 or higher in the Polity IV index of political regime characteristics.
7 Conclusions
This paper has been an attempt to look at whether aid is effective using a different approach
to that found in the existing literature. Given the range of contradictory findings on this
question, no single work can claim to be definitive. However, the approach taken here is free
from many of the difficulties encountered by the usual panel approach. In particular, the
PVAR method does not rest on the oft maligned instrumentation strategies used in much of
the previous work.
The results lie somewhere between the findings and arguments of aid pessimists and aid
optimists. Aid does seem to work in terms of generating economic growth but not to an
extent that could be called transformative. This conclusion is similar in flavour to that
of Dovern and Nunnenkamp (2007) who find that more aid is associated with a small but
statistically significant increase in the probability of a growth acceleration event. The results
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Figure 6: Autocratic IRFs
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Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries with a negative average value in the Polity IV index of political regime characteristics.
for human development were generally ambiguous but suggest that aid may induce small
increases in the variable used as a proxy for human development, the growth rate of life
expectancy at birth.
The major failing of the PVAR method is that it offers no insight into what the underlying
mechanisms generating these results might be. That said, much of this literature is based
on ad-hoc speculation and econometric specifications. The benefit of the approach is that,
as other VAR advocates point out, it lets the data speak for itself.
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A Summary Statistics and Sub-Sample Allocation
Table 1: Means of Variables Used
Country Growth rate of Growth rate of ODA ODA as a Doing Business Polity Democracy
Life Expectancy GDP per capita per capita percentage of GDP Rank Score
Benin 0.777 0.466 64.527 9.782 172 -1
Botswana -0.273 6.017 172.829 5.911 45 7
Burkina Faso 0.635 1.849 66.388 12.909 147 -4
Burundi 0.330 -0.234 56.202 18.623 176 -4
Cameroon 0.236 1.141 57.082 4.013 171 -6
Central African Republic 0.179 -1.220 78.300 12.041 183 -3
Chad 0.201 1.547 56.652 11.874 178 -4
Coˆte d’Ivoire 0.393 -1.497 57.644 4.103 168 -6
DR Congo 0.215 -3.783 26.721 8.449 182 -5
Gabon 0.631 0.784 167.456 1.790 158 -7
Gambia 0.849 0.567 119.769 20.230 140 3
Ghana 0.383 0.176 46.631 7.648 92 -2
Guinea-Bissau 0.663 -0.149 149.697 40.479 181 -3
Kenya -0.052 0.292 44.148 6.366 95 -4
Lesotho -0.317 3.016 102.086 17.163 130 -2
Liberia 0.696 -3.229 75.870 24.116 149 -3
Madagascar 0.837 -1.480 48.313 9.553 134 0
Malawi 0.630 -0.037 57.742 18.609 132 -4
Mali 0.671 1.478 79.681 16.654 156 -1
Mauritania 0.462 -0.226 223.875 22.284 166 -7
Niger 0.785 -1.421 67.676 13.665 174 -2
Nigeria 0.417 0.469 4.306 0.616 125 -2
Rep. Congo -0.129 1.383 122.089 6.590 179 -5
Rwanda 0.247 1.562 75.300 18.995 67 -6
Senegal 0.716 -0.034 110.040 10.127 157 0
Sierra Leone 0.686 -0.226 50.235 15.077 148 -4
Sudan 0.596 1.961 47.863 4.874 154 -5
Swaziland -0.268 2.596 94.583 4.823 115 -10
Togo 0.593 -0.414 69.909 9.487 165 -5
Zambia -0.463 -1.498 111.299 15.371 90 -3
Zimbabwe -0.882 -1.099 42.201 3.500 159 -2
Notes: Except in the case of Doing Business Rank, values are means over the period 1973-2005. The Doing Business data comes from
the 2010 issue. To be included in the good policy sample a country must place in the top 100 in the 2010 Doing Business rankings.
The democratic sample contains countries with an average Polity democracy score of 0 or higher.
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B Eight Lag GMM Estimates
Figure 7: Full Sample IRFs: GMM with Eight Lags
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Notes: Each panel shows the response of the indicated response variable to a one standard deviation shock in the shock variable.
Results obtained using the PVAR program kindly made available to me by Inessa Love.
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